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Abstract
We consider the problem of locating a public facility on a tree, where a set of n strategic agents
report their locations and a mechanism determines, either deterministically or randomly, the location
of the facility. Game theoretic perspectives of the facility location problem have advanced in two
main directions, one focusing on the characterization of strategyproof (SP) mechanisms and the other
quantifying how well various objective functions can be approximated by SP mechanisms. The present
paper advances the theory in both directions. First, we give a family of randomized SP mechanism for
any tree network. Quite miraculously, all of the deterministic and randomized SP mechanisms that have
been previously proposed for various objective functions are special cases of our mechanism. Thus, our
mechanism unifies much of the existing literature on SP approximation for facility location problems.
Second, we use our mechanism to prove new bounds on the approximation of the minimum sum of
squares (miniSOS) objective in tree networks. For randomized mechanisms, we propose a mechanism
that gives 1.5-approximation for the miniSOS function on the line, and show that no other randomized
SP mechanism can provide a better approximation. For tree networks, we propose a mechanism that
gives 1.83-approximation. This result provides a separation between deterministic and randomized
mechanisms, as we show that no deterministic mechanism can approximate the miniSOS function
within a factor better than 2, even for the line. Together, our study establishes a step toward the
characterization of randomized SP facility location mechanisms on a tree, and provides a fundamental
understanding of the miniSOS objective function.
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Recanati Fund of the Jerusalem School of Business Administration, the Google Inter-university center for Electronic Markets and
Auctions, and the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Unions Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-
2013) under REA grant agreement number 274919.
1 Introduction
In facility location problems, a social planner has to determine the location of a public facility that needs
to serve a set of agents. Once the facility is located, each agent incurs some cost that depends on the
distance from her ideal location to the chosen location of the facility. This class of problems is realized
in many scenarios, including, for example, locating a server in telecommunication networks or locating
a library or a fire station in a road network. Facility location problems arise not only in physical settings
like the ones just described, but also in more virtual settings where the agents’ opinions or preferences
can be represented as their locations, and a single outcome has to be chosen. As an example, consider a
set of students sitting in a classroom with an air conditioner, where every student has her most preferred
temperature, and a single temperature has to be chosen. In all of these examples, one “location” has to be
chosen, and every agent would like it to be as near as possible to her most preferred location.
What is the best method to settle the naturally conflicting preferences of the agents? In other words,
what is the best way to determine the location of the facility, given the agents’ locations? This question,
and related ones, have been extensively studied in the literature, from various conceptual and algorithmic
perspectives; see, e.g., Marsh and Schilling [17], the book by Handler and Mirchandani [12], and the
body of literature concerning the performance of a Condorcet point1 [5, 4, 14]. Starting with the work
of Moulin [18], this problem was also studied from a game-theoretic perspective, where the agents are
assumed to be strategic, i.e., report their locations in a way that will minimize their individual costs. The
game theoretic aspects of the facility location problem advanced in two main directions, as described
below.
The first direction seeks to characterize strategyproof (SP) mechanisms; i.e., mechanisms that induce
truthful reporting as a dominant strategy. This is a crucial attribute since in its absence, strategic agents
may misreport their locations. Moulin [18] and later Schummer and Vohra [20] provided characterizations
of deterministic SP mechanisms on line, tree, and cycle networks. While the work of Moulin [18] concen-
trated on general single-peaked2 preferences [6], Schummer and Vohra [20] considered the special case
in which the cost incurred by an agent is the length of the shortest path from the facility to her location.
These results were later extended to various metric spaces (see, e.g., Border and Jordan [7]).
The second direction, advocated more recently by Procaccia and Tennenholtz[19], seeks to study the
approximation ratio that can be obtained by an SP mechanism with respect to a given objective function.
This agenda, often termed “approximate mechanism design without money”, has led to extensive work on
several domains, including facility location [19, 1, 2, 16, 15, 11], machine learning [8], and matching [3,
9]. Unlike the traditional motivation for approximation, originating from computational hardness, here,
approximation is used to achieve strategyproofness.
The approximation ratio of a mechanism is defined with respect to a given objective function, and
the standard worst-case notion is being applied. The two objective functions that have been prominently
featured in the literature are the minisum (i.e., minimizing the sum of agents’ costs) and the minimax (i.e.,
minimizing the maximum cost of any agent) functions. While it is well known that the optimal location
on a tree with respect to the minisum function can be obtained by an SP mechanism (in particular, by
the median), it has been shown by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [19] that no deterministic (respectively,
randomized) SP mechanism on a line can achieve a better approximation than 2 (resp., 1.5) with respect
to the minimax function. Thus, the feasible approximation of SP mechanisms depends on the specified
objective function.
In this work, we propose a third objective function — minimizing the sum of squares of distances
(hereafter miniSOS). The miniSOS function is highly relevant in many economic settings, and is related to
central notions in other disciplines, such as the centroid in geometry, or the center of mass in physics. Of
1A Condorcet point is a location that is preferred to any other location by more than half the agents.
2With single-peaked preferences, every agent is associated with an ideal location, considered to be her peak, and the closer
the facility is to an agent’s peak, the most preferred it is.
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particular interest is the close relation to regression learning, where there is a one-to-one mapping between
facility location on a line and regression learning (restricted to the class of constant functions). Moreover,
the miniSOS objective has been given a rigorous foundation by Holzman [13] using an axiomatic approach.
In particular, Holzman formulated three axioms3 for locating a facility on a line or a tree, regarded as
sensible requirements, and showed that the unique objective function that satisfies the three axioms is the
miniSOS objective. Following the above motivation and the axiomatic foundation laid by Holzman, it
is only natural to study the approximation that can be obtained by SP mechanisms with respect to the
miniSOS function.
1.1 Our contribution
Our contribution spans both the characterization and the approximation agendas with respect to the line
and tree networks. The line topology is motivated by any one-dimensional decision that is made by aggre-
gating agents’ preferences. The tree topology is particularly motivated by the telecommunication networks
example, where a tree topology corresponds to any hierarchical network. Notably, in computer networks,
an agent can easily manipulate its perceived network location by generating a false IP address.
Characterization The characterization of SP mechanisms for facility location settings has been studied
thus far mainly with respect to deterministic mechanisms. A randomized mechanism receives a location
profile and returns a probability distribution over locations. It is well known that randomization can be
very powerful in social choice settings. In cases where the cost incurred by an agent is her distance from
the facility (as in the model of Schummer and Vohra [20]), it seems natural to define an agent’s cost as her
expected cost with respect to the given probability distribution. This is the approach taken by Procaccia
and Tennenholtz [19], and many studies thereafter [1, 2, 15]4. Quite surprisingly, while there has been
a surge of research on randomized SP mechanisms for facility location problems, there was very limited
effort on characterizing randomized SP mechanisms5.
We make a first step in providing a characterization for randomized SP mechanisms on a tree network.
In particular, we design a family of randomized mechanisms, termed parameterized boomerang (PB),
which is SP for any tree network. Quite miraculously, all of the mechanisms that have been devised re-
cently within the facility location domain (and shown to give tight bounds with respect to various objective
functions) can be formulated as special cases of mechanism PB. The generality and strength of mechanism
PB is further illustrated through the analysis of the miniSOS objective, where special cases of mechanism
PB are shown to achieve good approximation results on line and tree networks with respect to the min-
iSOS objective. Thus, the characterization of randomized SP mechanisms is not only interesting in itself
but also equips one with a large family of SP mechanisms, and can be served as a useful tool for studying
the approximation ratios with respect to various objectives. Mechanism PB is presented in Section 3.
Approximation We provide approximation results with respect to the miniSOS objective, for line and
tree networks, and for deterministic and randomized mechanisms. Notably, all the mechanisms that are
devised in this paper are special cases of mechanism PB.
3 In particular, Holzman formulated three axioms, which are (roughly speaking): (i) unanimity, stating that if all the agents
report the same location, then the reported location should be chosen, (ii) Lipschitz, which is a continuity requirement; and (iii)
invariance, stating that an agent who moves to a location that is equidistant from the outcome from the same direction will not
affect the chosen outcome.
4These works, however, focused on approximating various objective functions by SP mechanisms and not on characterizing
SP mechanisms.
5An exception is the work by Ehlers et al. [10], which characterizes randomized SP mechanisms, but is different from our
work in two respects. First, the characterization of Ehlers et al. applies only to a line network, while we are interested in the more
general case of a tree. Second, they use a different notion of preferences over probability distribution (in particular, preference
over probability distributions is defined in terms of first-order stochastic dominance), and, as a result, uses a different notion of
strategyproofness. This difference has significance effects, for example, on lower bound results for approximation.
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Line networks (Section 4). We show that the median gives a 2-approximation deterministic SP mecha-
nism, and that no deterministic SP mechanism can achieve a better approximation ratio. As in other stud-
ies [19, 2, 15, 3], randomized mechanisms are shown to provide better bounds. In particular, we present a
randomized SP mechanism that provides a 1.5-approximation; the mechanism chooses the average loca-
tion with probability 12 and a random dictator with probability
1
2 . In addition, we show that no randomized
SP mechanism can achieve a better bound. The proof technique used to construct the lower bound involves
subtle analysis and is perhaps one of the main technical contributions of the paper. Interestingly, while the
minimax and the miniSOS functions induce different optimal solutions, and different optimal SP mecha-
nisms, they admit the exact same approximation bounds with respect to both deterministic and randomized
mechanisms.
Tree networks (Section 5). First, we show that the median gives a 2-approximation with respect to
the miniSOS objective. This result is tight with respect to deterministic mechanisms, following the lower
bound established on the line. Our main result in the approximation regime is the construction of a ran-
domized SP mechanism that gives a 1.83-approximation for any tree network. This result establishes a
separation between deterministic and randomized mechanisms, as no deterministic mechanism can pro-
vide a better approximation than 2.
1.2 Open Problems
Our study leaves many questions for future research. The first natural challenge is to provide a full char-
acterization for SP randomized mechanisms on a tree. For the miniSOS objective function, closing the
approximation gap for the randomized mechanisms on a tree remains open. In addition, it would be in-
teresting to extend the approximation results for the miniSOS function to other networks topologies, such
as a cycle and general networks, similar to the studies by Alon et al. [1, 2] with respect to the minimax
and the minisum functions. An additional direction is to consider a different individual cost function. For
example, in applications in which agents are more sensitive to distances within the range of high distances,
a convex cost function seems plausible (a possible example might be the speed of an Internet connection).
Finally, the three different social functions that have been studied thus far can be considered as special
cases of the ℓ-norm distance, with minisum, miniSOS, and minimax corresponding to the 1-norm, 2-norm,
and ∞-norm, respectively. It is apparent that while for the minisum function, the optimal location can be
obtained in an SP mechanism, this is not feasible for either 2- or ∞-norms, and the same approximation
bounds apply in both cases. Generalizing this result to any ℓ-norm is an additional stimulating direction.
2 Model and Preliminaries
We use the model of Schummer and Vohra [20], where the network is represented by a graph G, formalized
as follows. The graph is a closed, connected subset of Euclidean space G ⊆ Rk. The graph is composed
of a finite number of closed curves of finite length, known as the edges6. The extremities of the curves are
known as vertices (or nodes). An important class of graphs, which is the focus of this paper, is tree graphs
— graphs that contain no cycles.
The path between two points a, b ∈ G is denoted by pathG(a, b). The distance between two points
a, b ∈ G, denoted dG(a, b), is the length of the (unique) path between a and b. We extend the definition of
distance between points to distance between a point and a path as follows. Given a point c ∈ G and a path
pathG(a, b), the distance between c and path(a, b), denoted dG(pathG(a, b), c), is the shortest distance
between c and any point on path(a, b); i.e., dG(pathG(a, b), c) = minl∈pathG(a,b)dG(l, c). When clear in
context, we omit the subscript G.
6 Note that while this model is expanding upon the notion of an interval, it is not analyzing full-dimensional, convex subsets of
Euclidean space. Rather, travel is restricted to a road network, where convex combinations of locations are typically not feasible.
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Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents. We sometime use [n] to denote the set of agents N . Each
agent i ∈ N has an (ideal) location xi ∈ G (agents can be located anywhere on G). The collection
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ G
n is referred to as the location profile.
A deterministic mechanism is a function f : Gn → G that maps the agents’ reported locations to the
location of a facility (which can be located anywhere on G). If the facility is located at y ∈ G, the cost of
agent i is the distance between xi and y; i.e., cost(y, xi) = d(y, xi).
A randomized mechanism is a function f : Gn → ∆(G), which maps location profiles to probability
distributions over G (which randomly designate the facility location). Let P ∈ ∆(G) be a probability
distribution over G. If f(x) = P , then the cost of agent i is the expected distance of the facility location
from xi; i.e., cost(P, xi) = Ey∼P [cost(y, xi)]. When clear in the context, we write y ∼ f(x) for ease of
presentation.
A mechanism is called strategyproof (SP), or truthful, if no agent can benefit from misreporting her
location, regardless of the reports of the other agents. Formally, in our scenario, this means that for all
x ∈ Gn, for all i ∈ N , and for all x′i ∈ G, it holds that cost(f(x), xi) ≤ cost(f(x′i, x−i), xi), where
x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) is the profile of all locations, excluding agent i’s location.
The quality of a facility location is usually evaluated with respect to some target social function. Given
a location profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) and a facility location y, the social cost of y with respect to x is given
by a function sc(y,x). The social cost of a distribution P with respect to x is sc(P,x) = Ey∼P [sc(y,x)].
Given a social cost function, location y ∈ G is said to be optimal with respect to a profile x if
sc(y,x) = miny′∈Gsc(y
′,x). An optimal location is denoted by Opt(G,x). When clear in the con-
text, we simply write Opt. In addition, we often abuse notation and use Opt to refer to the social cost of
an optimal location.
A mechanism f is said to provide α-approximation with respect to a social cost function sc if for every
graph G and every location profile x, sc(f(x),x)/sc(Opt,x) ≤ α; that is, the mechanism always returns
a solution that is an α factor of the optimal solution.
In this paper we are interested in optimizing the sum of squared distances (SOS) function; that is,
sc(y,x) =
∑
i∈N d(y, xi)
2
. This objective function is extremely important from both normative and
positive perspectives, as discussed in the introduction.
Given a profile x, the median of x in a tree G, denoted by µ(G,x), is defined as follows. We start from
an arbitrary node (induced by G) as a root. Then, as long as the current location has a subtree that contains
more than half of the agents, we smoothly move down this subtree. Finally, when we reach a point where
it is not possible to move closer to more than half the agents by continuing downwards, we stop and return
the current location.
We continue with several graph theoretic definitions and lemmas. At this point, it is necessary to
emphasis the difference between a location profile, which was defined earlier and is tightly coupled with a
set of agents, and a location vector, which is a set of locations in the graph.
Definition 1 Given a tree G and a point x ∈ G, let T (G,x) be the set of subtrees defined as follows. If x
is a tree node (with degree dx), then T (G,x) = {T1, . . . , T|dx|}, where Ti is the subtree of descendant i
rooted at x. If x is not a node (i.e., it is a point on an edge), then T (G,x) = {T1, T2}, where T1 and T2
are the respective left and right subtrees rooted at x.
Definition 2 Let G be a tree, y ∈ Gm be a location vector, and w be a probability vector of size
m. The weighted average location with respect to G,y and w, denoted wAvg(G,y,w), is a point
in G which minimizes the weighted sum of squared distances from the locations in y; i.e., wAvg ∈
argminl∈G
∑
j∈[m]wjd(l, yj)
2
.
The following lemmas will be required in the sequel. Their proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
Lemma 3 Let y ∈ Gm be a location vector, and w a probability vector of size m. It holds that a =
4
wAvg(G,y,w) if and only if for every Tj ∈ T (G, a),∑
i∈[m]:yi∈Tj
wid(yi, a) ≤
∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈Tj
wid(yi, a).
Corollary 4 Let y ∈ Gm be a location vector, and w a probability vector of size m. The weighted average
location with respect to G,y and w is unique.
Lemma 5 Let y,y′ ∈ Gm be location vectors, and w be a probability vector of size m. For every
i ∈ [m], let δi = d(yi, y′i) . Let a = wAvg(G,y,w) and a′ = wAvg(G,y′ ,w). It holds that d(a, a′) ≤∑
i∈[m]wiδi.
Lemma 6 Let x ∈ Gn be a location profile. Let a, b ∈ G be two locations, and let Tb ∈ T (G, a) and
Ta ∈ T (G, b) such that they contain path(a, b), and assume that all of the agents are either in G\Ta, in
G\Tb, or on path(a, b). Additionally, assume that Opt is located in G\Ta. Then, sc(a,x) − sc(b,x) =
−|N |d(a, b)2 − 2d(a, b)
(∑
i∈G\Tb
d(xi, a)−
∑
i∈Tb
d(xi, a)
)
Corollary 7 Let x ∈ Gn be a location profile, and let a, b ∈ G as described in Lemma 6. Let x′ be
constructed as follows. Let xj ∈ G\Ta be the most far agent from b in G\Ta, and for each i such
that xi ∈ G\Ta, locate x′i on path(b, xj) such that d(b, x′i) = d(b, xi). Then, sc(a,x) − sc(b,x) =
−|N |d(a, b)2 + 2|N |d(a, b)d(a,Opt′)
3 Randomized SP Mechanisms on a Tree
In this section we introduce a family of randomized SP mechanism for locating a facility on a tree. Unless
otherwise stated, the graph G in this section is assumed to be a tree.
The following notion of a boomerang mechanism is a key concept in our construction.
Definition 8 A deterministic mechanism f is said to be a boomerang mechanism if for every location
profile x, agent i, and point x′i, cost(f(x′), xi)− cost(f(x), xi) = d(f(x′), f(x)), where x′ = (x′i, x−i).
That is, a boomerang mechanism is one in which a deviating agent fully absorbs the effect of her deviation
on the facility location. Clearly, every boomerang mechanism is SP.
Several examples of boomerang mechanisms follow: (The proof is left to the reader.) (i) dictatorship;
i.e., where there exists i ∈ N such that for every x, f(x) = xi. (ii) median (on a tree). (iii) k’th-location
(on a line); also known as generalized median [18].
We are now ready to introduce the family of randomized SP mechanisms for tree networks. This family
is presented as a parameterized mechanism, called “parameterized boomerang”.
Mechanism parameterized boomerang PB: Let f = (f1, . . . , fm) be a collection of boomerang
mechanisms. For every i ∈ [m], let yi = fi(x), and let y = (y1, . . . , ym). Let w be a probability distribu-
tion supported on m elements, and let a = wAvg(G,y,w). The facility location is chosen according to
the following probability distribution:
• for every i ∈ [m], choose fi(x) with probability 12wi.
• choose a with probability 12 .
We refer to the two components of the probability distribution as the boomerang component and average
component, respectively. Note that every boomerang mechanism is a special case of PB, with m = 1.
The following theorem, whose proof is deferred to Appendix B, establishes the strategyproofness of
Mechanism PB. It is followed by an immediate corollary.
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Theorem 9 Mechanism PB is SP.
Corollary 10 Every fixed probability distribution over PB mechanisms is SP.
In recent years, various SP mechanisms have been proposed in the literature for the facility location
problem on the line with the objective of approximating different social objectives, such as the minisum
and the minimax functions. The following proposition shows that all of the mechanisms that have been
proposed in this context are special cases of Mechanism PB (or a probability distribution over PB mecha-
nisms). The proof is deferred to Appendix B.
Proposition 11 The following mechanisms on the line are special cases of Mechanism PB (or a probabil-
ity distribution over PB mechanisms).
1. k-location. Examples of this mechanism are the median mechanism, which is known to minimize
the sum of distances, and the leftmost agent mechanism, which provides a 2-approximation for the
minimax objective [19] (which is tight with respect to deterministic mechanisms).
2. left-right-middle (LRM) [19]. LRM chooses the leftmost agent with probability 14 , the rightmost
agent with probability 14 , and their middle point with probability
1
2 . It provides a (tight) 1.5-
approximation for the minimax objective.
3. random dictator (RD). RD chooses every agent with probability 1n . It provides a 2− 2n -approximation
for the minisum objective [1]. We will later establish that RD gives a 2-approximation for the
miniSOS objective (see Theorem 16).
While it is evident from the last proposition that Mechanism PB is very powerful, it imposes a sufficient
condition for strategyproofness, but not a necessary one. This is established by Example 24 that could be
found in Appendix B.
4 SP Mechanisms on a Line
In this section, we study how well SP mechanisms can approximate the miniSOS objective — minimizing
the sum of squared distanced — on a line. In the deterministic case, we present a mechanism that provides
2-approximation, and show that no SP deterministic mechanism can achieve a better ratio. In the random-
ized case, we construct a mechanism that provides 1.5-approximation, and show that this result is tight.
All missing proofs in this section are deferred to Appendix C.
In this section, the graph is essentially the real line, R. It is easy to verify that an optimal location in
this case is simply the average.
Claim 12 Given a location profile x, the optimal facility location with respect to the miniSOS objective is
the average location; i.e., Opt = argminysc(y,x) =
∑
i∈N xi
n .
The following lemma proves extremely useful in establishing the lower bounds throughout this sec-
tion. In particular, it helps us relate joint deviations (i.e., coordinated deviations by a subset of agents) to
unilateral deviations (i.e., deviations by a single agent).
Lemma 13 Let a, b, c ∈ R be three locations such that a ≤ b ≤ c, with at least one strict inequality, and
for every m ∈ [n], let x0 (respectively, xm) be a location profile in which n −m agents are located at a,
and m agents are located at c (resp., b). Let f be a randomized mechanism. If f is an SP mechanism, then
E[|c− y0|] ≤ E[|c − ym|] and E[|b− ym|] ≤ E[|b− y0|], where y0 ∼ f(x0) and ym ∼ f(xm).
4.1 Deterministic mechanisms
Theorem 14 Given a location profile x, the mechanism that chooses the median location in x is an SP
2-approximation mechanism for the miniSOS objective.
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Notably, this mechanism is a special case of mechanism PB.
The following theorem shows that factor 2 is tight with respect to deterministic SP mechanisms.
Theorem 15 Any deterministic truthful mechanism has an approximation ratio of at least 2 for the min-
iSOS objective.
4.2 Randomized mechanisms
A natural candidate of a randomized mechanism to be considered in our context is the random dictator
(RD) mechanism, which chooses each agent’s location with probability 1n . This mechanism is SP and is
known to provide a
(
2− 2n
)
-approximation with respect to the minisum objective function (See [1] and
[2]). The following theorem shows that the RD mechanism provides a 2-approximation for the miniSOS
objective. More precisely, for every location profile, the RD mechanism yields an SOS cost that is exactly
twice the cost of the optimal location. This is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 16 For every location profile, the RD mechanism yields an SOS cost that is exactly twice the
optimal SOS cost.
As shown in Proposition 11, the RD mechanism is a probability distribution over PB mechanisms.
Apparently, the RD mechanism does not perform better the deterministic median mechanism. Yet,
this mechanism turns out to be useful when integrated within a more sophisticated mechanism, as shown
below.
Mechanism 1 Given x ∈ Rn, choose the average point with probability 12 , and apply the RD mechanism
with probability 12 (i.e., for every i ∈ N , xi is chosen with probability 12n ).
Theorem 17 Mechanism 1 is an SP 1.5-approximation for the SOS objective.
Notably, while approximation in its usual sense looks at the worst-case ratio between the expected cost
of the mechanisms solution and the cost of the optimal solution, in this case the 1.5-approximation applies
not only in the worst-case notion; rather, this is the exact approximation achieved for every location profile.
Surprisingly, Mechanism 1 provides the best possible approximation; that is, no SP mechanism, ran-
domized or not, can achieve a better approximation ratio than 1.5. This bound is established in the next
theorem. Due to lack of space, we give an overview of the proof, and defer the full proof to Appendix C.
Theorem 18 Any randomized SP mechanism has an approximation ratio of at least 1.5 for the miniSOS
objective.
Proof Sketch. Assume on the contrary that there exist an SP mechanism f(x) and ǫ > 0 such that f(x)
yields an approximation ratio of 1.5−ǫ, and let y be a random variable that is distributed according to f(x).
Starting at the original profile, we construct a series of profiles, on which we repeatedly apply Lemma 13.
Using this technique, we prove that there exist some a ∈ R and a location profile x in which n2 agents are
located at a and n2 agents are located at a + 4, such that E[|y − (a + 1)| + |y − (a + 3)|] > 3 − 2ǫ. We
then use the last inequality to show that E[sc(y,x)] > 6n − 4nǫ. By observing that the optimal facility
location for this profile is at a+2 (which yields an SOS cost of 4n), we get E[sc(y,x)]Opt > 6n−4nǫ4n = 1.5− ǫ,
and a contradiction is reached. 
5 SP Mechanisms on a Tree
In this section, we study the miniSOS objective with respect to locating the facility on a tree. In the de-
terministic case, we show that the median of a tree provides a 2-approximation for the miniSOS objective,
and show that no SP deterministic mechanism can achieve a better ratio with respect to miniSOS. In the
randomized case, we construct an instance of Mechanism PB, which obtains a 1.83-approximation.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the iterative process described in the proof of Theorem 19. Gj−1 is illustrated
on the left, and Gj is illustrated on the right, where the dashed line represents the new edge.
5.1 Deterministic mechanisms
It is well known that the mechanism that chooses a median of a tree is SP (see, e.g., [1]). The following
theorem establishes that a median also gives a 2-approximation for the miniSOS objective, which is tight,
according to Theorem 15. The theorem is followed by a sketch of the proof. The full proof is deferred to
Appendix D.
Theorem 19 The median of a tree is an SP 2-approximation mechanism for the miniSOS objective.
Proof Sketch. Given an instance (G,x), we iteratively transform it, in a way that can only make the
approximation ratio obtained by the median worse, and eventually prove the desired approximation ratio
on the final instance. Let µ and Opt denote the respective median and optimal location in the original
profile. The iterative process proceeds as follows. As long as there exists an agent j such that xj’s subtree
is rooted at the open interval path(µ,Opt), pick such an agent j, create a new edge of length d(xj , Opt),
rooted at Opt, and locate xj at its tip (see illustration in Figure 1). It can be proved that the median and the
optimal location did not change as a result of this transformation, and that the optimal cost did not change
either. The cost of the median, however, can only increase. Therefore, the approximation ratio can only
get worse by each transformation. Upon termination of this process, we prove the desired approximation
ratio on the final instance by reducing it to the deterministic scenario on a line and applying Theorem 14.

5.2 Randomized mechanisms
In this section we present an instance of mechanism PB, which obtains 1.83-approximation for trees, with
respect to the miniSOS objective. Our randomized mechanism uses the following deterministic mechanism
as a building block. It is followed by a proposition, whose proof is deferred to Appendix D.
Mechanism dictatorial-generalized-median (DGM): Mechanism DGM receives as pa-
rameters an index i ∈ [n], and a fraction q ∈ (1/2, 1]. The facility location is chosen deterministically,
with respect to i and q, as follows. Fix the point xi as the root of the tree, and denote the current location
a. Then, as long as there exists a subtree in T (G, a) that contains at least fraction q of the agents (this is
well defined, since q > 1/2), smoothly move down this subtree. Finally, when we reach a point where it
is not possible to move closer to at least fraction q of the agents by continuing downwards, we stop and
return the current location.
Proposition 20 Mechanism DGM is a boomerang mechanism.
Note that mechanism DGM is not a boomerang mechanism for q ≤ 1/2, as a beneficial misreport can
exist, depending on the tie-breaking rule.
With this we are ready to introduce our randomized mechanism.
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Mechanism randomized DGM: Mechanism randomized DGM receives as a parameter a fraction
q ∈ (1/2, 2/3], and applies mechanism PB with the following parameters: m = n, wi = 1/n for every
i ∈ [n], and for every i ∈ [n], fi(x) is mechanism DGM with parameters i and q.
Interestingly, the following property holds. Its proof is deferred to the appendix.
Lemma 21 For every tree G, the points f1(x), . . . , fn(x), calculated by Mechanism randomized DGM,
are located on a single path.
In the remainder of this section, we shall use the notation suggested in Lemma 21, i.e., for every
i ∈ [n], let yi = fi(x). This is followed by another notation - avg(y), which represents the average
location on path(y1, yn), given the locations in y.
The main result of this section establishes that Mechanism randomized DGM, with q = 2/3, obtains
an approximation ratio of 1.83 for trees.
Theorem 22 Let G and x be a tree and a location profile, respectively. Mechanism randomized DGM
with q = 2/3 obtains an approximation ratio of 1.83 with respect to the miniSOS objective.
Before presenting the proof sketch of the theorem, we observe that it can be assumed w.l.o.g that
y1 6= yn, as the following lemma establishes.
Lemma 23 If y1 = y2 = . . . = yn, then the approximation ratio obtained by Mechanism randomized
DGM is at most 1.5.
We are now ready to present an overview of the proof of Theorem 22.
Proof Sketch. The proof of this theorem requires several lemmata, which correspond to various trans-
formations that are needed in order to prove the desired approximation ratio. We shall describe the proof
schematically along with a graphical illustration, but defer the formal statements of the lemmata and their
proofs to Appendix D. Following Lemma 23, we assume that y1 6= yn. Additionally, we assume, without
loss of generality, that d(y1, yn) = 1, and scale the graph accordingly. We let O¯pt denote the closest
location on path(y1, yn) to Opt, i.e., O¯pt = minl∈path(y1,yn)d(Opt, l). For ease of presentation, we refer
to Mechanism randomized DGM with q = 2/3 as “the mechanism”.
The proof is established as follows. Given a graph G and a location profile x, we run them through
various transformations, and show that the approximation ratio obtained by the mechanism could only get
worse in every transformation. Eventually, we prove that the mechanism provides a 1.83-approximation
ratio on the final graph and location profile, which implies an upper bound of 1.83 on the original instance.
More specifically, given an instance (G,x), we proceed as follows:
• We transform the graph repeatedly according to Lemma 27, which results in a graph in which all of
the agents that are not located on path(y1, yn) are rooted at either y1, yn, or O¯pt (see Figure 2).
• Assuming that avg(y) is on path(y1, O¯pt) (the proof follows analogously if avg(y) is on
path(O¯pt, yn)), we then transform the graph according to Lemma 28 and Lemma 29 such that all
the agents rooted at y1 (i.e., all agents i such that yi = y1) are located at y1, and all the agents rooted
at yn (i.e., all agents i such that yi = yn) are located on their own new edges, rooted at yn, and
equally distanced from it (see Figures 3 and 4).
At this point, the transformed graph can be shown to have the following properties: At least |N |/3 agents
are located at y1; at least |N |/3 agents are located on new edges, rooted at yn and equally distanced from it;
some agents are scattered along path(y1, yn); and the rest are located on edges that are rooted at the same
location on path(y1, yn). Denote this location by p. The location p is essentially the original location of
O¯pt (note that after transforming the graph using Lemma 28, O¯ptmight be relocated). We now distinguish
between several cases, depending on p’s location:
• If p is located at yn, then Opt could be located either at yn as well, or in a subtree rooted at p. In
the former case, a 112 -approximation is obtained, by Lemma 32. In the latter case, we transform the
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graph using Lemma 30 (see Figure 5), and by Lemma 33 we achieve an approximation ratio of 1.83.
• If p is located on the open interval path(y1, yn), we transform the graph using Corollary 31 (see
Figure 5), and again, by Lemma 33, we achieve an approximation ratio of 1.83.
By observing that p cannot be located at y1, we conclude that these two cases exhaust all the possibilities
for p’s location. In conclusion, since all the transformations are shown to only worsen the approximation
ratio, the 1.83-approximation that is obtained for the final instance, imposes the same upper bound on the
original one, and the assertion of the theorem follows.

y1
yn
yi
xi
O¯pt
Opt
y1
yn
xi
O¯pt
Opt
Figure 2: Lemma 27’s transformation assures that all the agents that are not located on path(y1, yn) are
rooted at either y1, yn, or O¯pt.
y1
yn
xi
O¯pt
Opt
y1
yn
xi
O¯pt
Opt
Figure 3: Lemma 28’s transformation assures that all agents that are rooted at y1 are in fact located at y1.
y1
yn
xi
O¯pt
Opt
y1
yn
xi
O¯pt
Opt
Figure 4: Lemma 29 averages the distance of the agents that are rooted at yn.
y1
yn
xi
O¯pt
Opt
y1
yn
O¯pt
xi
Opt
Figure 5: Lemma 30 and Corollary 31 average the distance of the agents that are rooted at O¯pt, while
locating them on the same subtree.
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APPENDIX
A Missing proofs in Section 2
Proof. of Lemma 3: Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists Tj ∈ T (G, a), such that∑
i∈[m]:yi∈Tj
wid(yi, a) >
∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈Tj
wid(yi, a). (1)
Let b be the distance between a and the closest vertex or location in y in the subtree Tj (such that d(a, b) >
0). Let h(y) be a function h : [0, b)→ R that yields the weighted sum of squared distances for the location
that is distanced y from a on the subtree Tj . It holds that
h′(0+) =
∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈Tj
wi2d(yi, a)−
∑
i∈[m]:yi∈Tj
wi2d(yi, a) < 0,
where the last inequality follows by Equation (1). It follows that there exists a location for which the
weighted SOS distances is lower than in a; hence we reach a contradiction.
Sufficiency: Assume that for every Tj ∈ T (G, a), it holds that∑
i∈[m]:yi∈Tj
wid(yi, a) ≤
∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈Tj
wid(yi, a),
and suppose by way of contradiction that a is not the weighted average location. Let b be a weighted
average location. Let Tb ∈ T (G, a) be the subtree such that b ∈ Tb. Let Sa ∈ T (G, b) be the subtree such
that a ∈ Sa.
Since T (G, b)\Sa ⊂ Tb , it holds that∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈Sa
wid(yi, b) <
∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈Sa
wid(yi, a) ≤
∑
i∈[m]:yi∈Tb
wid(yi, a). (2)
In a similar manner, since T (G, a)\Tb ⊂ Sa, it holds that∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈Tb
wid(yi, a) <
∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈Tb
wid(yi, b) ≤
∑
i∈[m]:yi∈Sa
wid(yi, b). (3)
Following the fact that ∑
i∈[m]:yi∈Tb
wid(yi, a) ≤
∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈Tb
wid(yi, a),
and using Equations (2) and (3), it follows that∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈Sa
wid(yi, b) <
∑
i∈[m]:yi∈Sa
wid(yi, b),
which contradicts necessity; the assertion follows. 
Proof. of Corollary 4: Assume by way of contradiction that there exist two different weighted average
locations, denoted by a and b. Following Lemma 3, for every Tj ∈ T (G, a), it holds that∑
i∈[m]:yi∈Tj
wid(yi, a) ≤
∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈Tj
wid(yi, a).
i
Following the same notation and reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 3 (sufficiency), it follows that∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈Sa
wid(yi, b) <
∑
i∈[m]:yi∈Sa
wid(yi, b),
which, according to Lemma 3, implies that b is not a weighted average location. The assertion follows. 
Proof. of Lemma 5: Assume on the contrary that d(a, a′) >
∑
i∈[m]wiδi. Let T0 ∈ T (G, a) be the subtree
such that a′ ∈ T0, and let S0 ∈ T (G, a′) be the subtree such that a ∈ S0. By Lemma 3 we know that
0 ≤
∑
i∈[m]:yi /∈T0
wid(yi, a)−
∑
i∈[m]:yi∈T0
wid(yi, a).
It follows that
−
∑
i∈[m]
wiδi ≤
∑
i∈[m]:y′i /∈T0
wid(y
′
i, a)−
∑
i∈[m]:y′i∈T0
wid(y
′
i, a). (4)
We note that T (G, a)\T0 ⊂ S0 and that T (G, a′)\S0 ⊂ T0. The next equations follow.∑
i∈[m]:y′i∈S0
wid(y
′
i, a
′) =
∑
i∈[m]:y′i /∈T0
wi
(
d(y′i, a) + d(a, a
′)
)
+
∑
i∈[m]:y′i∈T0∩S0
wid(y
′
i, a
′), (5)
∑
i∈[m]:y′
i
∈T0
wid(y
′
i, a) =
∑
i∈[m]:y′
i
/∈S0
wi
(
d(y′i, a
′) + d(a, a′)
)
+
∑
i∈[m]:y′
i
∈T0∩S0
wid(y
′
i, a). (6)
Considering that ∑
i∈[m]:y′i∈T0∩S0
wid(y
′
i, a
′) +
∑
i∈[m]:y′i∈T0∩S0
wid(y
′
i, a) ≥
∑
i∈[m]:y′i∈T0∩S0
wid(a
′, a),
and combining Equations (5) and (6), it follows that∑
i∈[m]:y′i∈S0
wid(y
′
i, a
′)−
∑
i∈[m]:y′i /∈S0
wid(y
′
i, a
′) ≥
∑
i∈[m]:y′i /∈T0
wid(y
′
i, a)−
∑
i∈[m]:y′i∈T0
wid(y
′
i, a) +
∑
i∈[m]
wid(a, a
′). (7)
Since d(a, a′) >
∑
i∈[m]wiδi, it follows from Equations (4) and (7) that∑
i∈[m]:y′
i
∈S0
wid(y
′
i, a
′)−
∑
i∈[m]:y′
i
/∈S0
wid(y
′
i, a
′) > 0.
It then follows by Lemma 3 that a′ cannot be the weighted average location with respect to G,y′ and w;
hence we reach a contradiction. 
Proof. of Lemma 6 For ease of presentation, we denote δ = d(a, b). When taking sc(a,x) as a basis, the
increase of cost when examining sc(b,x) is as follows∑
i∈G\Tb
(2d(xi, a)δ + δ
2) +
∑
i∈Tb
(2d(xi, a)δ − δ
2) =
|N |δ2 + 2δ(
∑
i∈G\Tb
d(xi, a)−
∑
i∈Tb
d(xi, a))
ii
The assertion follows. 
Proof. of Corollary 7 It is easy to see that sc(a,x) = sc(a,x′), that sc(b,x) = sc(b,x′), and that∑
i∈G\Tb
d(xi, a)−
∑
i∈Tb
d(xi, a) =
∑
i∈G\Tb
d(x′i, a)−
∑
i∈Tb
d(x′i, a). It is left to show that
∑
i∈G\Tb
d(x′i, a)−∑
i∈Tb
d(x′i, a) = −|N |d(a,Opt
′).
It is clear that there are exactly two subtrees in T (G,Opt′) which contain agents (given x′). We denote
them by TOpt1, which contain a, and TOpt2. Followed by Lemma 3, it is easy to see that
∑
x′i ∈ TOpt1d(x
′
i, Opt
′) =∑
x′i ∈ TOpt2d(x
′
i, Opt
′). It follows that∑
i∈G\Tb
(d(x′i, a) + d(a,Opt
′)) +
∑
i∈Tb∩TOpt1
(d(a,Opt′)− d(x′i, a)) =
∑
i∈TOpt2
(d(x′i, a)− d(a,Opt
′))⇔
∑
i∈G\Tb
d(x′i, a)−
∑
i∈Tb
d(x′i, a) = −|N |d(a,Opt
′).
The assertion follows. 
B Missing proofs in Section 3
Proof. of Theorem 9: Assume by way of contradiction that there exists an agent i that can benefit by
misreporting her location as x′i, inducing a location profile x′ = (x′i, x−i). We quantify the effect of the
deviation on the boomerang component and the average component of Mechanism PB. We begin with the
boomerang component. For every j ∈ [m], let δj = d(fj(x′), xi) − d(fj(x), xi) be the additional cost
incurred by i due to the deviation, when fj is chosen. Since fj is a boomerang mechanism, it holds that
d(fj(x
′), xi) − d(fj(x), xi) = d(fj(x
′), fj(x)) ≥ 0. Therefore, the additional cost incurred by i due
to the boomerang component is
∑
j∈[m]wjδj =
∑
j∈[m]wjd(fj(x
′), fj(x)). By Lemma 5, the average
component reduces agent i’s cost by at most
∑
j∈[m]wjd(fj(x
′), fj(x)). The assertion of the theorem
follows. 
Proof. of Proposition 11: In what follows we establish the correctness of the assertions of the proposition.
1. Any mechanism that chooses the k-location, is an instance of Mechanism PB, as it is a boomerang
mechanism.
2. The left-right-middle (LRM) mechanism is an instance of Mechanism PB, with m = 2, w =
(1/2, 1/2), and f1 and f2 being the left-most and right-most mechanisms, respectively (which are
boomerang mechanisms). The weighted average location is the center of the left-most and right-
most locations, and is chosen with probability 1/2, while each of the extreme points is chosen with
probability 1/4.
3. The random dictator (RD) mechanism is the uniform distribution over dictator mechanisms, which
are boomerang mechanisms. The assertion follows by Corollary 10.

Example 24 Consider the following mechanism on a line. Choose each of the leftmost and rightmost
agents with probability 12n , and the center of every two consecutive locations with probability 1n . It is easy
to verify that this is an SP mechanism, yet it cannot be formulated as a special case of Mechanism PB or
a probability distribution over PB mechanisms.
iii
C Missing proofs in Section 4
Proof. of Claim 12: The optimal location can be derived by taking the derivative of the SOS cost function.
As the derivative of
∑
i∈N |y − xi|
2 is
∑
i∈N 2y − 2xi, the point that minimizes the SOS cost is
∑
i∈N xi
n .

Proof. of Lemma 13: In the profile x0, m agents are located at c. For j = 0, . . . ,m, let xj be the profile
in which n −m agents are located at a, j agents are located at b, and m − j agents are located at c; and
let yj ∼ f(xj). Since f is SP, it must hold that E[|c − y0|] ≤ E[|c − y1|]; otherwise, in the profile x0,
every agent can decrease her cost by misreporting her location to be at b instead of c. Similarly, for every
j = 2, . . . ,m, it holds that E[|c − yj−1|] ≤ E[|c − yj|]. It follows that E[|c − y0|] ≤ E[|c − ym|]. The
same line of arguments is used to prove that E[|b− ym|] ≤ E[|b− y0|], which concludes the proof. 
Proof. of Theorem 14 Let µ be a median location in x. It is well known that the median mechanism on
a line is truthful (see, e.g., [19]). Therefore, it remains to show that it provides a 2-approximation to the
miniSOS objective; formally, we need to show that∑
i∈N
|xi − µ|
2 ≤ 2
∑
i∈N
|Opt− xi|
2. (8)
Assume without loss of generality that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn. Assume additionally that µ ≤ Opt (the proof
works analogously for the case in which µ ≥ Opt). It is easy to verify that∑
i∈N
|xi − µ|
2 =
∑
i∈N
|(xi −Opt) + (Opt− µ)|
2
=
∑
i∈N
(
(xi −Opt)
2 + 2(Opt− µ)(xi −
Opt+ µ
2
)
)
.
Therefore, by subtracting
∑
i∈N |Opt− xi|
2 from both sides, it remains to prove that
∑
i∈N
2(Opt− µ)(xi −
Opt+ µ
2
) ≤
∑
i∈N
|Opt− xi|
2,
which is equivalent to showing that
∑
i≤⌈n/2⌉
2(Opt− µ)
(
(xi −
Opt+ µ
2
) + (xn+1−i −
Opt+ µ
2
)
)
≤
∑
i≤⌈n/2⌉
|Opt− xi|
2 + |Opt− xn+1−i|
2.
We next show that the last inequality holds piecewise; i.e., for every i ≤ ⌈n/2⌉, it holds that
2(Opt− µ)
(
(xi −
Opt+ µ
2
) + (xn+1−i −
Opt+ µ
2
)
)
≤ (Opt− xi)
2 + (Opt− xn+1−i)
2.
For every i ≤ ⌈n/2⌉, it holds that xi ≤ µ ≤ Opt; thus (Opt− µ)2 ≤ (Opt− xi)2, and it suffices to show
that
2(Opt− µ)
(
µ−
Opt+ µ
2
+ xn+1−i −
Opt+ µ
2
)
)
≤ (Opt− µ)2 + (Opt− xn+1−i)
2.
It can be easily verified that the above inequality holds iff (2Opt− µ− xn+1−i)2 ≥ 0; the assertion of the
theorem follows. 
iv
Proof. of Theorem 15: Assume by way of contradiction that there exists a deterministic SP mechanism f
which yields a better approximation than 2. Consider a location profile x, in which n2 agents are located
at 0, and n2 agents are located at 2, and let f(x) = p. Simple calculations show that to achieve a better
approximation than 2, it must hold that p ∈ (0, 2) (note that the optimal location is 1, which obtains an
SOS cost of n, while the locations 0 or 2 obtains each an SOS cost of 2n). Now consider a different
location profile, denoted xp, in which n2 agents are located at 0, and
n
2 agents are located at p. Following
the same argument, it must hold that f(xp) ∈ (0, p), and thus |p − f(xp)| > 0. Since f(x) = p, we get
that |p− f(xp)| > |p− f(x)|, which implies, by Lemma 13, that f is not SP. 
Proof. of Theorem 16: Let rd(x) denote the RD mechanism. It holds that
sc(rd(x),x) =
∑
i∈N
1
n
∑
j∈N
(xi − xj)
2 (by def. of sc)
=
∑
i∈N
x2i +
∑
j∈N
x2j −
2
n
∑
j∈N
∑
i∈N
xixj
= 2
∑
i∈N
x2i −
2
n
∑
j∈N
xj
∑
i∈N
(
2xi −
∑
j∈N xj
n
)
(by ∑i∈N (xi − ∑j∈N xjn ) = 0)
= 2
∑
i∈N
x2i − 2Opt
∑
i∈N
(2xi −Opt) (by Observation 12)
= 2
∑
i∈N
(Opt− xi)
2
= 2sc(Opt,x) (by def. of sc).

Proof. of Theorem 17: We first prove the approximation factor. Let g(x) denote mechanism 1, and let
avg(x) denote the average point. By Observation 12, the optimal location with respect to miniSOS is
avg(x). We get
sc(g(x),x)
Opt
=
1
2RD(x) +
1
2avg(x)
avg(x)
= 1.5,
where the last equation follows by Theorem 16.
In order to show the strategyproofness of the mechanism, it suffices to prove that it is an instance of
Mechanism PB. Indeed, one can easily verify that this is a special case in which m = n, w is the uniform
distribution over [n], and for every i ∈ [n], fi(x) = xi (i.e., fi is dictatorship with agent i as the dictator).

Proof. of Theorem 18: Assume on the contrary that there exists an SP mechanism f(x) and ǫ > 0 such
that f(x) yields an approximation ratio of 1.5 − ǫ, and let y ∼ f(x) (i.e., y is a random variable that is
distributed according to f(x)). We shall use the following lemma in the proof.
Lemma 25 There exists some a ∈ R and a location profile x in which n2 agents are located at a and n2
agents are located at a+ 4, such that E[|y − (a+ 1)|+ |y − (a+ 3)|] > 3− 2ǫ.
Proof. Consider a location profile x0, in which n2 agents are located at 0 and
n
2 agents are located at 4, and
let y0 ∼ f(x0). If E[|y0−3|+|y0−1|] > 3−2ǫ, then we are done. Otherwise, either E[|y0−1|] ≤ 1.5−ǫ
or E[|y0− 3|] ≤ 1.5− ǫ. Assume w.l.o.g. that the latter holds, and consider a location profile x¯0, in which
n
2 agents are located at 0 and the rest are located at 3. Let y¯
0 ∼ f(x¯0). By Lemma 13, to preserve
truthfulness, it must hold that E[|y¯0 − 3|] ≤ 1.5 − ǫ, which implies that E[|y¯0 − 0|] ≥ 1.5 + ǫ.
v
Consider next a location profile x1, in which n2 agents are located at −1 and the rest are located at 3,
and let y1 ∼ f(x1). By Lemma 13, to preserve truthfulness, it must hold that E[|y1 − 0|] ≥ 1.5 + ǫ. If
E[|y1 − 2|+ |y1 − 0|] > 3− 2ǫ, then we are done. Otherwise, it follows that E[|y1 − 2|] ≤ 1.5− 3ǫ.
We continue iterating such that in iteration j = 1, 2, . . ., a profile xj is considered, in which half the
agents are located at−j and half are located at 4− j, and for every profile xj , we denote by yj the random
variable distributed according to f(xj). We show that there exists some j for which E[|yj − (1 − j)| +
|yj − (3 − j)|] > 3 − 2ǫ; the assertion of the lemma then follows by substituting a = −j. It remains to
prove the last inequality. Indeed, by repeatedly applying Lemma 13 for every j, we get that
if E[|yj − (1− j)| + |yj − (3− j)|] ≤ 3− 2ǫ, then E[|yj − (3− j)|] ≤ 1.5 − ǫ(2j + 1). (9)
But since for j > 1.5−ǫ2ǫ , it holds that 1.5−ǫ(2j+1) < 0, it must hold that E[|y
j−(3−j)|] > 1.5−ǫ(2j+1),
which, by Equation 9 implies that E[|yj − (1− j)| + |yj − (3− j)|] > 3− 2ǫ. It follows that the profile
xj satisfies the conditions of the lemma, and the proof follows. 
With this lemma, we are ready to prove the theorem. Let x be a location profile that satisfies the conditions
of Lemma 25, and assume w.l.o.g. that x is a profile in which half the agents are located at 0 and half at 4.
By the last lemma, it holds that
E[|y − 1|+ |y − 3|] > 3− 2ǫ, (10)
where y ∼ f(x). For ease of presentation, let p = Pr(|y − 2| ≤ 1) and let z = E[|y − 2| : |y − 2| > 1].
It holds that
E[|y − 1|+ |y − 3|] = E [|y − 1|+ |y − 3| : |y − 2| > 1] (1− p)
+ E [|y − 1|+ |y − 3| : |y − 2| ≤ 1] p
= 2z(1 − p) + 2p.
Therefore, by Equation (10), it follows that 2z(1− p)+ 2p > 3− 2ǫ. Since z > 1 by definition, it follows
that
p < 1−
1− 2ǫ
2z − 2
. (11)
We now turn to calculate the SOS cost of the profile x induced by the mechanism f(x). It holds that
E[sc(y,x)] = E[sc(y,x) : |y − 2| ≤ 1]p+ E[sc(y,x) : |y − 2| > 1](1 − p)
≥ sc(E[y : |y − 2| ≤ 1],x)p + E[sc(y,x) : |y − 2| > 1](1 − p), (12)
where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. Since 2 is the optimal location in the profile x,
it holds that
sc(E[y : |y − 2| ≤ 1],x) ≥ sc(2,x) = 4n. (13)
We also have that
E[sc(y,x) : |y − 2| > 1] = E[
n
2
(y2 + (y − 4)2) : |y − 2| > 1]
=
n
2
(8 + 2E[(y − 2)2 : |y − 2| > 1])
≥
n
2
(8 + 2E2[|y − 2| : |y − 2| > 1])
=
n
2
(8 + 2z2), (14)
where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. By Substituting (13) and (14) in (12), we get
that E[sc(y,x)] ≥ n2 (8 + 2z
2 − 2z2p). It, therefore, follows by (11) that
E[sc(y,x)] >
n
2
(8 + 2z2 − 2z2(1−
1− 2ǫ
2z − 2
)) = 4n+
nz2(1− 2ǫ)
2z − 2
. (15)
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It is easy to verify that this function attains its minimum at z = 2, with a value of 6n − 4nǫ. Thus,
E[sc(y,x)] > 6n−4nǫ. The optimal solution is to locate the facility at 2, which yields an SOS cost of 4n.
We get that E[sc(y,x)]Opt >
6n−4nǫ
4n = 1.5 − ǫ, and a contradiction is reached. The assertion of the theorem
follows.  
D Missing proofs in Section 5
Proof. of Theorem 19: It has been shown in earlier papers that a median of a tree is SP (see, e.g., [1]).
Here we show that it provides 2-approximation with respect to the miniSOS objective.
We start with some notation. Given a location profile x, let µ and Opt denote the median and the optimal
location, respectively. Let TOptµ ∈ T (G,µ) denote the subtree of T (G,µ) that contains Opt, and let
L(G,x) ⊆ N denote the subset of agents i such that xi 6∈ TOptµ \ {µ}. Similarly, let T µOpt ∈ T (G,Opt)
denote the subtree of T (G,Opt) that contains µ, and let R(G,x) ⊆ N denote the subset of agents i such
that xi 6∈ T µOpt \ {Opt}. Finally, let M(G,x) ⊆ N denote the subset of agents that belong to neither L
nor R. These are the agents i, such that xi 6= µ and xi 6= Opt, for which path(xi, µ) ∩ path(xi, Opt) is
one location on the graph, rather than a path. When clear in the context, we simplify notation and write
L,R,M .
With this, we continue. Suppose µ 6= Opt (if µ = Opt, we are done). Let k be the number of agents in
M(G,x), and refer to these agents as x1, . . . , xk (order them arbitrarily). In what follows we describe an
iterative process, which starts with a tuple (G0 = G,x0 = x) of graph and location profile, and in every
iteration j ∈ [k], a new tuple (Gj ,xj) is induced in a specific manner that will be specified soon. We will
show that the approximation ratio in every such iteration can only get worse. The assertion of the theorem
will then be established by proving the desired approximation ratio on the final instance.
For every j ∈ [k], let Optj and µj denote the respective optimal location and median with respect to
(Gj ,xj). For every j ∈ [k], define (Gj ,xj) as follows. Starting with Gj−1, add an edge, rooted at
Optj−1, of length dG (xj , Opt(G,x)), and move xj from its position in Gj−1 to the end of this edge (see
Figure 1 for illustration). We will also use the notation xji to denote the location of xi in Gj for every
i ∈ [n], j ∈ [k].
It is easy to see that µj = µj−1 for every j (since agents never cross the median in their new location). We
shall, therefore, use µ to denote the median of every iteration.
It is slightly more subtle to see that the optimal point does not change either; i.e., Optj = Optj−1 for
every j ∈ [k].
Lemma 26 For every j ∈ [k], it holds that Optj−1 = Optj .
Proof. Let Tµ denote the subtree of T (Gj−1, Optj−1) that contains µ. Note that in Gj−1, xj ∈ Tµ
as well. Let T ′µ denote the subtree of T (Gj , Optj−1) that contains µ, and let Tj denote the subtree of
T (Gj , Optj−1) that contains xj . Note that |T (Gj , Optj−1)| = |T (Gj−1, Optj−1)|+ 1.
By applying Lemma 3 with w as the uniform distribution, for every T ∈ T (Gj−1, Optj−1), it holds that∑
i∈[n]:xj−1i ∈T
d(xj−1i , Opt
j−1) ≤
∑
i∈[n]:xj−1i /∈T
d(xj−1i , Opt
j−1).
It is not too difficult to see that this implies that for every T ′ ∈ T (Gj , Optj−1) such that T ′ 6= T ′µ, Tj , it
holds that ∑
i∈[n]:xji∈T
′
d(xji , Opt
j−1) ≤
∑
i∈[n]:xji /∈T
′
d(xji , Opt
j−1).
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In addition, due to the fact that we split Tµ into T ′µ and Tj , the same holds for them. It follows from
Lemma 3 that Optj−1 = Optj . 
Since this iterative process changed neither the optimal location, nor the distance of the agents from the
optimal location, the optimal social cost did not change either. That is, the optimal social cost in (G,x)
is the same as the optimal social cost in (Gk,xk). In contrast to the optimal cost, it is not difficult to see
that the mechanism’s cost increased. This is because the distance between µ and the agents in M(G,x)
increased (while it did not change for the other agents). It follows that it is sufficient to prove the desired
approximation ratio on the instance (Gk,xk).
In order to establish a 2-approximation on (Gk,xk), we modify the instance (Gk,xk) to a line instance
(R, z) (for z ∈ Rn), such that, the distances of every agent from the median and from the optimal location
are preserved.
Let Lk = L(Gk,xk), Rk = R(Gk,xk) and Mk = M(Gk,xk). By construction, Mk = ∅. Consider the
following location profile, (z1, . . . , zn), on a line. For every i ∈ Lk, let zi be located at−dGk(xki , µk). For
every i ∈ Rk, let zi be located at dGk(µk, xki ) (which is equal to dGk(µk, Optk) + dGk(xki , Optk)). Let
b = dGk(µ
k, Optk). For every i ∈ [n] it holds that d(zi, 0) = dGk(xki , µk), and d(zi, b) = dGk(xki , Optk);
i.e., the respective distances from µk and Optk were preserved.
Let µz and Optz denote the median and the optimal location with respect to (R, z), respectively. It is easy
to verify that µz ≤ 0 and Optz ≥ b. By Theorem 14, locating the facility at µz provides 2-approximation
for this line instance. But since µz ≤ 0 < b ≤ Optz, it follows that locating the facility at 0 yields a social
cost (SOS) that is at most twice that of b; i.e.,∑
i∈[n]
d(zi, 0)
2 ≤ 2
∑
i∈[n]
d(zi, b)
2.
However, because the respective distances from µk and Optk were preserved, it follows that∑
i∈[n]
dGk(x
k
i , µ
k)2 ≤ 2
∑
i∈[n]
dGk(x
k
i , Opt
k)2,
as required; the assertion follows. 
Proof. of Proposition 20: It is easy to verify that an agent can modify the location of the mechanism’s
outcome only by declaring herself to be on the location’s opposite side, thus pushing the returned facility
location away from its true location. It follows directly that the distance between the original location and
the new one is exactly the additional cost imposed on a misreporting agent. 
Proof. of Lemma 21: For every i ∈ [n], let yi = fi(x). By design, every subtree T ∈ T (G, yj) (excluding
yj) contains less than qn agents. Assume by way of contradiction that the points y1, . . . , yn are not located
on a single path. Let Ty be the subtree induced by connecting all the yi’s (i.e., for any a ∈ Ty , there exist
i, j ∈ [n] such that a ∈ path(yi, yj). By the contradiction assumption, Ty contains at least three leaves;
assume w.l.o.g. these leaves are y1, y2, y3. Then, for every j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, there exists a subtree in T (G, yj),
call it T j , that contains Ty. By design, T j\{yj} contains less than qn agents; therefore, more than (1−q)n
agents are located at {T (G, yj) \ T j} ∪ {yj}. It is easy to verify that {T (G, y1) \ T 1} ∪ {y1} ⊂ T 3 \ y3
and also {T (G, y2) \ T 2} ∪ {y2} ⊂ T 3 \ y3. We get that T 3 \ y3 contains more than (2 − 2q)n ≥ 23n
agents, where the last inequality follows by 12 < q ≤
2
3 . This contradicts the choice of y3 by f3(x); the
assertion follows. 
Proof. of Lemma 23: Assume that the optimal location is not at y1 (otherwise, the approximation ratio is
1 and we are done). By design, if y1 = y2 = . . . = yn, then there does not exist T ∈ T (G, y1) such that
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there are more than n/3 agents in T \{y1}. Let TOpt ∈ T (G, y1) such that the optimal location is in TOpt.
Let G′ be a new tree which is created by positioning a new subtree T ′ which is constructed by a long edge,
rooted at y1, and let x′ be a new location profile, such that for any xi ∈ TOpt \ {y1}, x′i is located on T ′, at
the location that is distanced d(y1, xi) from y1. Let the optimal location with respect to the new tree and
x′ be denoted as Opt′. Let δ denote d(Opt′, y1). It is straightforward that because Opt is in TOpt, then
Opt′ is in T ′. Let TR ∈ T (G′, Opt′) such that y1 ∈ TR and let TL be the other subtree.
Following a simple variation of Corollary 7, it holds that
scG′(y1,x
′) = scG′(Opt
′,x′) + nδ2. (16)
By Lemma 3 it follows that
∑
x′i∈TL
d(x′i, Opt
′) =
∑
x′i∈TR
d(x′i, Opt
′). Since the right expression is at
least 23nδ, so is the left one.
We shall next examine the social cost of Opt′ with respect to G′ and x′. at least 23n agents in TR add
at least δ2 each to the social cost obtained at Opt′. On the other hand, following Jensen’s inequality, the
minimal addition agents in TL yield to the social cost is obtained when they are located at distance of∑
x′
i
∈TL
d(x′i,Opt
′)
|TL|
from Opt′. Thus, their addition is at least
|TL|
(∑
x′i∈TL
d(x′i, Opt
′)
|TL|
)2
≥ |TL|
(
2
3nδ
|TL|
)2
.
As this expression decreases in |TL|, and noting that |TL| ≤ n3 , it follows that their addition is at least
4
3nδ
2
. Summing it all together, it follows that the scG′(Opt′,x′) ≥ 2nδ2. Applying (16), it follows that
scG′(y1,x
′)
scG′(Opt′,x′)
≤ 1.5.
Now, when considering G and x, we see that the mechanism’s induced social cost does not change (as the
distances from y1 do not change), while we added constraints that might affect the optimal location. The
assertion follows. 
We shall now present the formal statements of the lemmata that are required in the proof of Theorem 22.
Since y1 and yn are symmetric, we state and prove every lemma for one case; the complementary one can
be proved analogously.
Lemma 27 Let i be an agent such that yi is in the open path(y1, yn), and assume that O¯pt ∈ path(yi, yn).
Let (G′,x′) be a transformation of (G,x) as follows. If d(xi, yi) ≤ d(y1, yi), then position i on path(y1, yi),
distanced d(xi, yi) from yi. If d(xi, yi) > d(y1, yi), then create an edge, rooted at y1, of length d(xi, yi)−
d(y1, yi), and locate i at its tip. Let (G′′,x′′) be a transformation of (G,x) as follows. Create an edge,
rooted at O¯pt, of length d(xi, O¯pt), and place i at its tip. Then, the mechanism obtains a worse approxi-
mation ratio for at least one of the tuples (G′,x′) and (G′′,x′′), compared to (G,x).
Proof. We start by defining a parameterized instance, namely (Gδ ,xδ), as follows. For any 0 ≤ δ ≤
d(y′i, O¯pt), originating at (G′,x′), create an edge rooted at the location that is distanced δ from y′i on
path(y′i, O¯pt), of length d(x′i, y′i)+δ, and locate i at its tip. We note that (G0,x0) and (Gd(y
0
i ,O¯pt),xd(y
0
i ,O¯pt))
are in fact (G′,x′) and (G′′,x′′), respectively.
Note that the optimal cost for any δ does not change, as the distance between agent i and the original
optimal location does not change, and the other agents are left untouched. Therefore, it is left to show that
the social cost obtained by the mechanism is higher for either δ = 0 or for δ = d(y0i , O¯pt) than the social
cost obtained for the original instance (G,x).
We shall use the following notations. Let Li denote the agents that do not share the same subtree of y0i
as yn, i.e., let Tn ∈ T (G0, y0i ) such that yn ∈ Tn; then, j ∈ Li iff x0j /∈ Tn. Given δ, let M δi be defined
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as follows. j ∈ M δi iff j 6= i and yj ∈ path(y0i , yδi ). Let Rδi be the complementary set of the agents
excluding agent i, i.e., Rδi = N−i\{Li ∪M δi }. Let Lavg(y0) denote the agents that do not share the same
subtree of avg(y0) as yn, i.e., let Tn ∈ T (G0, avg(y0)) such that yn ∈ Tn, then j ∈ Lavg(y0) iff x0j /∈ Tn.
Similarly, we shall define Ravg(y0) = N\Lavg(y0).
Let σ = min(d(y1, yi), d(xi, yi)). We note that G is in fact Gσ . Let h(δ) represent the social cost obtained
by the mechanism for the instance (Gδ ,xδ). We shall next show how h(δ) differs from h(0), i.e., we shall
characterize g(δ) such that h(δ) = h(0) + g(δ).
As we come to analyze g(δ), we can divide the analysis into two components, namely the agent component
and the weighted average component.
We shall start with the agent component. If the projected location of an agent j ∈ Rδi is chosen, then
the obtained social cost does not change, as the distance of xi from yj does not change. If the projected
location of an agent j ∈ Li is chosen (i.e., yj), then the social cost increases (with respect to G0 and x0)
by
4d(yj , x
0
i )δ + 4δ
2. (17)
If the projected location of an agent j ∈M δi is chosen, then the social cost increases by
4d(yj , x
0
i )(δ − d(yj , y
0
i )) + 4(δ − d(yj , y
0
i ))
2. (18)
If the projected location of agent i is chosen, then the social cost increases by
∑
j∈Li
(
2d(y0i , xj)δ + δ
2
)
−
∑
j∈{Mδi ∪R
δ
i }
(
2d(y0i , xj)δ − δ
2
)
+ δ2, (19)
where the last summand is for i herself. Every agent’s projected location is chosen with probability 12n ,
thereby deriving the agents component in f(δ).
We continue with the weighted average component. The influence obtained by the weighted average com-
ponent (i.e., by avg(y)), consists of two parts; namely, the movement of avg(y) itself, and the influence
of the movement of i on the social price obtained by avg(y). For the first part, since avg(y) smoothly
slides towards yn by the distance of δn , the difference in cost originating by the first part is given by
∑
j∈L
avg(y0)
(
2d(x0j , avg(y))
δ
n
+
(
δ
n
)2)
−
∑
j∈R
avg(y0)
(
2d(x0j , avg(y))
δ
n
−
(
δ
n
)2)
. (20)
For the second part, similarly to the classification done when characterizing the agents’ component, we
need to distinguish between three scenarios. Denote this influence by β.
If avg(yδ) is not on the same subtree of y0i as yn, i.e., let Tn ∈ T (G0, y0i ) such that yn ∈ Tn, and
avg(yδ) /∈ Tn, then β = 4d(avg(yδ), x0i )δ+4δ2. If avg(yδ) ∈ path(y0i , yδi ), then β = 4d(avg(yδ), x0i )(δ−
d(avg(yδ), y0i ))+4(δ−d(avg(y
δ), y0i ))
2
. If neither of the above holds, then it preserves its distance from
xi, i.e., β = 0.
x
In summary, when summing over the different components, we get:
g(δ) =
1
2n

∑
j∈Li
(
4d(yj , x
0
i )δ + 4δ
2
)+
1
2n

∑
j∈Mδi
(
4d(yj , x
0
i )(δ − d(yj , y
0
i )) + 4(δ − d(yj , y
0
i ))
2
)+
1
2n

∑
j∈Li
(
2d(y0i , xj)δ + δ
2
)
−
∑
j∈{Mδ
i
∪Rδ
i
}
(
2d(y0i , xj)δ − δ
2
)
+ δ2

+
1
2

 ∑
j∈L
avg(y0)
(
2d(x0j , avg(y))
δ
n
+
(
δ
n
)2)
−
∑
j∈R
avg(y0)
(
2d(x0j , avg(y))
δ
n
−
(
δ
n
)2)
+ β

 .
One can verify that g(δ) is continuous, and is piecewise differentiable (in particular, it is not differentiable
for any δ such that there exists j ∈ N\Li such that δ = d(y0i , yj), and when δ is such that avg(yδ) = yδi ).
Moreover, one can also verify that for any δ, the left-hand derivative is smaller or equal to the right-hand
derivative of g, i.e., for any δ, g′−(δ) ≤ g′+(δ). In other words, g(δ)’s derivative is monotonically increasing
where it is defined (this can be easily seen, as the quadratic components are all positive). Recalling that
h(δ) = h(0) + g(δ), and considering that 0 ≤ σ ≤ d(y0i , O¯pt), it follows that either h(0) ≥ h(σ), or
h(d(y0i , O¯pt)) ≥ h(σ). The fact that (Gσ ,xσ) is (G,x) concludes the proof.

Lemma 28 Let T1 be the subtree of T (G, avg(y)) that contains y1 and assume that Opt /∈ T1. Let
(G′,x′) be a transformation of (G,x) that, for every agent i for which yi = y1, locates x′i at y1. Then, the
approximation ratio obtained by the mechanism for (G′,x′) cannot be better than the ratio obtained for
(G,x).
Proof. Let δ = d(xi, x′i). The difference between the social cost obtained by the mechanism for (G,x)
and for (G′,x′) is given by
∑
j∈N
1
2n
(
2d(xi, yj)δ − δ
2
)
+
1
2
(
2d(xi, avg(y))δ − δ
2
)
=
− δ2 +
∑
j∈N
1
2n
2(d(xi, y1) + d(y1, yj))δ +
1
2
2(d(xi, y1) + d(y1, avg(y)))δ =
− δ2 + 2d(xi, y1)δ +
∑
j∈N
1
2n
2d(y1, yj)δ +
1
2
2d(y1, avg(y))δ =
− δ2 + 2d(xi, y1)δ + 2d(y1, avg(y))δ,
where the last equality follows from
∑
j∈N d(y1, yj) = nd(y1, avg(y)).
In contrast, it is easy to verify that the optimal cost decreases by at least 2d(xi, y1)δ + 2d(y1, Opt)δ − δ2.
As d(y1, avg(y)) ≤ d(y1, Opt), the assertion follows. 
Lemma 29 Let TOpt be the subtree in T (G, yn) that contains Opt. Let N0 = {i ∈ N : yi = yn, xi /∈
TOpt}, and let σ =
∑
i∈N0
d(xi, yn). Let (G′,x′) be a transformation of (G,x) that, for each i ∈ N0,
creates an edge of length σ|N0| , rooted at yn, and locates x′i at its tip. Then, the approximation ratio
obtained by the mechanism for (G′,x′) cannot be better than the ratio obtained for (G,x).
xi
Proof. We first note that for each i ∈ N0, y′i did not move. Therefore, the locations that have a positive
probability of being chosen by the randomized mechanism do not change.
Let δi denote the difference in distances of agent i from yn, induced by the transition to (G′,x′), i.e.,
δi = d(yn, x
′
i) − d(yn, xi). Recall that d(yn, x′i) = σ|N0| , thus it is easy to see that
∑
(δi) = 0. It follows
that the increase of cost in (G′,x′) is as follows.
∑
i∈N0,δi≥0

∑
j∈N
1
2n
(
2d(xi, yj)δi + δ
2
i
)
+
1
2
(
2d(xi, avg(y))δi + δ
2
i
) +
∑
i∈N0,δi<0

∑
j∈N
1
2n
(
2d(xi, yj)δi + δ
2
i
)
+
1
2
(
2d(xi, avg(y))δi + δ
2
i
) =
∑
i∈N0,δi≥0
(
2d(xi, avg(y))δi + δ
2
i
)
+
∑
i∈N0,δi<0
(
2d(xi, avg(y))δi + δ
2
i
)
=
∑
i∈N0,δi≥0
(
2d(x′i, avg(y))δi − δ
2
i
)
+
∑
i∈N0,δi<0
(
2d(x′i, avg(y))δi − δ
2
i
)
=
∑
i∈N0
−δ2i ,
Where the last two equalities are due to d(xi, avg(y)) + δ = d(x′i, avg(y)) and to
∑
(δi) = 0. We note
that in the transition from (G,x) to (G′,x′), Opt’s location does not change (see Lemma 3). Therefore, in
the same manner, the optimal cost decreases by
∑
i∈N δ
2
i as well. It follows directly that the approximation
ratio cannot decrease in the transformation. 
Lemma 30 Assume that O¯pt is located at yn, but Opt is not, and let TOpt be the subtree in T (G, O¯pt)
that contains Opt. Let N1 = {i ∈ N : xi ∈ TOpt}, and let σ =
∑
i∈N1
d(xi, O¯pt). Let (G′,x′) be a
transformation of (G,x) that creates an edge of length σ|N1| , rooted at O¯pt, and locates all of the agents in
N1 at its tip. Then, the approximation ratio obtained by the mechanism for (G′,x′) cannot be better than
the ratio obtained for (G,x).
Proof. We shall prove the lemma in two steps. In particular, the instance (G′,x′) shall be induced by
(G,x) through an intermediate instance (G′′,x′′), as follows. Let j ∈ N1 denote the agent whose location
is the farthest away from O¯pt, i.e., j = argmaxi∈N1d(xi, O¯pt), and for each i ∈ N1, let x′′i be located
on path(xj , O¯pt), distanced d(xi, O¯pt) from O¯pt. It is easy to verify that the cost of the randomized
mechanism does not change in the transformation, while when examining the optimal location, clearly its
induced cost decreases, as agents in N1 could only move closer to it. It follows that the approximation
ratio increased by the transformation. Next, we make the transformation from (G′′,x′′) to (G′,x′), and
show that the approximation ratio keeps getting worse.
Using the notation of the proof of Lemma 29, let δi denote the difference of distances of agent i from O¯pt,
induced by the transformation from (G′′,x′′) to (G′,x′). Following the steps of the proof of Lemma 29,
it follows that the mechanism’s induced cost is reduced by
∑
i∈N1
δ2i . We next show that the optimal cost
decreases by the same amount.
It is clear that Opt′′ divides G′′ to exactly two subtrees. Let T1, T2 ∈ T (G′′, Opt′′) be the two subtrees
induced by Opt′′. By Lemma 3 it follows that
∑
i∈T1
d(x′′i , Opt
′′) =
∑
i∈T2
d(x′′i , Opt
′′). After averaging,
it is easy to verify that
∑
i∈T1
d(x′i, Opt
′′) =
∑
i∈T2
d(x′i, Opt
′′), and thus by Lemma 3 it follows that the
optimal location does not change. Therefore, the same calculation from Lemma 29 holds for the optimal
location, and thus the optimal cost decreases by
∑
i∈N1
δ2i as well. The assertion of the lemma follows. 
Corollary 31 Let p be some location on the open interval path(y1, yn). Let N2 = {i ∈ N : yi = p}, and
let σ =
∑
i∈N2
d(xi, p). Let (G′,x′) be a transformation of (G,x) that creates an edge of length σ|N2| ,
xii
rooted at p, and locates all of the agents from N2 at its tip. Then, the approximation ratio obtained by the
mechanism for (G′,x′) cannot be better than the ratio obtained for (G,x).
Proof. By observing that the process does not change the locations of y1, y2, . . . , yn, the proof is identical
to the one of Lemma 30. 
Lemma 32 Assume that for each i such that yi 6= yn, it holds that yi = xi. Let N3 = {i ∈ N : yi =
yn, xi 6= yn}, and assume that for any j, k ∈ N3 it holds that d(xj , yn) = d(xk, yn) and that xj and xk
are not located on the same subtree induced by T (G, yn). Then, the approximation ratio obtained by the
mechanism is at most 112 .
Proof. Let γ = d(avg(y), yn), and let δ denote the distance between agents in N3 and yn. Note that Opt
can be located only on path(y1, yn). We consider the following two cases: the case in which opt is located
at yn, and the case in which it is located somewhere else on path(y1, yn). We start with the latter case.
Due to Lemma 3, it follows that
∑
i/∈N3
d(xi, yn) >
∑
i∈N3
d(xi, yn). Since∑
i/∈N3
d(xi, yn) =
∑
i/∈N3
d(yi, yn) =
∑
i∈N
d(yi, yn) = |N |d(avg(y), yn),
and
∑
i∈N3
d(xi, yn) = |N3|δ, it follows that
|N |γ > |N3|δ. (21)
Let x′ be derived from x, such that for any i ∈ N3, x′i = yn. We note that all of the agents in x′
are located on path(y1, yn), and that the mechanism described in Section 4.2 is identical to Mechanism
randomized DGM with q = 2/3, when activated on x′. Thus, due to Theorem 17 it follows that the
approximation ratio is at most 1.5, i.e, sc(f(x
′),x′)
sc(Opt′,x′) ≤ 1.5. We note that for x
′
, avg(y) and Opt are located
at the same location. When making the transformation to x, the mechanism’s possible locations do not
change, and it is easy to see that the mechanism’s induced cost increases by |N3|(2γδ+δ2). The change of
the optimal cost can be calculated by checking how the original optimal location’s induced cost increases
by the transformation, and how it decreases by smoothly moving the location to the new optimal location,
i.e., by calculating (sc(Opt′,x)− sc(Opt′,x′))− (sc(Opt′,x)− sc(Opt,x)). Thus, using Lemma 6, the
optimal cost increases by
|N3|(2γδ + δ
2)−
|N3|
2δ2
|N |
. (22)
Therefore, the approximation ratio of G and x is as follow.
sc(f(x′),x′) + |N3|(2γδ + δ2)
sc(Opt′,x′) + |N3|(2γδ + δ2)−
|N3|2δ2
|N |
. (23)
It follows that it is sufficient to prove that |N3|(2γδ+δ
2)
|N3|(2γδ+δ2)−
|N3|
2δ2
|N|
≤ 1.5. By a simple rearrangement, this is
equivalent to proving that 3 |N3|δ|N | ≤ 2γ + δ. Using (21), it follows that
3
|N3|δ
|N |
≤ 2
|N3|δ
|N |
+ δ ≤ 2γ + δ,
and the assertion follows for the case in which Opt is located on path(y1, yn), excluding yn.
We now turn to prove the lemma for the case in which Opt is located at yn. We follow the steps of the proof
of the first case, only this time the optimal location moves from avg(y) to yn, and thus in the transition,
xiii
the optimal cost increases by |N3|(2γδ + δ2)− |N |
(
2 |N3|δ|N | γ − γ
2
)
. Therefore, in the same manner, it is
sufficient to prove that
|N3|(2γδ + δ
2)
|N3|(2γδ + δ2)− |N |
(
2 |N3|δ|N | γ − γ
2
) ≤ 1.5, (24)
which is equivalent to
3|N |
(
2
|N3|δ
|N |
γ − γ2
)
≤ |N3|(2γδ + δ
2). (25)
Clearly, |N3| ≤ 23 |N | ≤
3
4 |N |. It follows that
3|N |
(
2
|N3|δ
|N |
γ − γ2
)
= 6|N3|δγ − 3|N |γ
2 ≤ 6|N3|δγ − 4|N3|γ
2. (26)
Using (26) in (25), it is sufficient to show that
6|N3|δγ − 4|N3|γ
2 ≤ |N3|(2γδ + δ
2),
which is equivalent to showing that (2γ − δ)2 ≥ 0. The assertion follows. 
Lemma 33 Let G and x be a graph and a location profile as follows. Q ⊂ N agents are located at y1;
P ⊂ N agents are equally distanced from yn, each on a different subtree of T (G, yn), such that for each
agent i ∈ P it holds that yi = yn; M ⊂ N agents are located at the same location, distanced δ from
path(y1, yn), and the rest of the agents (i.e., agents in N\{P ∪Q∪M}) are scattered along path(y1, yn).
Then, the approximation ratio obtained by the mechanism is at most 1.83.
Proof. We start with a few preparations. First of all, we normalize d(y1, yn) to be 1, and rescale the graph
accordingly. Given i ∈ M let yM = yi. Let β denote the distance between y1 and yM , and assume
d(y1, yM ) ≤ d(yM , yn) (the proof works analogously for d(y1, yM ) ≥ d(yM , yn)). Let x′ be defined as
follows. for each i ∈M , let x′i = yi; for the other agents, let x′i = xi.
Due to Lemma 32, it holds that
sc(f(x′),x′)
sc(Opt′,x′)
≤ 1
1
2
. (27)
Let ∆Opt = sc(Opt,x)− sc(Opt′,x′) and ∆Ran = sc(f(x),x) − sc(f(x′),x′).
We start with providing an upper bound for ∆ran.
We first observe that |Q| should contain the minimal number of agents in order to maximize the costs’
difference. Indeed, each agent that could be relocated at P , keeping y1 fixed (meaning, keeping |Q| ≥
|N |/3), would increase the costs’ difference. The same holds for any agent that is located anywhere on
the open path(y1, yn).
We next observe that the distance between yM and avg(y) cannot be higher than 23−
|M |
|N | , due to the follow-
ing. Assuming that avg(y) is on path(yM , yn) (the proof works identically for avg(y) on path(y1, yM )),
let x0 be constructed such that x0 differs from x such that for each i ∈ M , x0i = yn. Its easy to verify
that d(avg(y0), yM )− |M ||N | d(yn, yM ) = d(avg(y), yM ), as in the transition of each agent in |M | from x
0
to x, the weighted optimal location transitions by 1|N |d(yn, yM ). Therefore, the distance between yM and
avg(y) is bounded as follows:
d(yM , avg(y)) = d(avg(y
0), yM )−
|M |
|N |
d(yn, yM ) = d(yn, yM)
(
1−
|M |
|N |
)
−d(yn, avg(y
0)) ≤
2
3
−
|M |
|N |
,
(28)
where the last equality is due to the fact that because there are at least |N |3 agents that are projected on each
side of path(y1, yn), d(yn, avg(y0)) must be bigger than 13 .
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We can now bound the difference of costs between sc(f(x),x) and sc(f(x′),x′), by the following expres-
sion (an explanation follows):
|M |
[
|M |
2|N |
δ2 +
1
6
(2βδ + δ2) +
(
1
3
−
|M |
2|N |
)
(2(1 − β)δ + δ2) +
1
2
(2
(
2
3
−
|M |
|N |
)
δ + δ2)
]
. (29)
Each summand represents the expected difference of costs induced by each location with a positive prob-
ability. The first summand stands for agents in M (the difference of costs when choosing agent in M is
δ2, and the probability is |M |2|N | ); the second summand stands for agents in Q, and as shown earlier, in order
to bound the difference, we assume that |Q| = 13 ; the next summand stands for P , and the probability of
choosing an agent in P is calculated given |M |; and avg(y) is the last summand. Naturally, the whole
expression is multiplied by |M |, as the expected difference of costs is multiplied by the number of agents
that make the transition.
By rearranging expression (29), we get
|M |
[
δ2 + β
(
|M |δ
|N |
−
δ
3
)
+
4
3
δ −
2|M |δ
|N |
]
. (30)
Since |M ||N | ≤
1
3 , it holds that β
(
|M |δ
|N | −
δ
3
)
≤ 0. It, therefore, follows that
∆Ran ≤ |M |
[
δ2 +
4
3
δ −
2|M |δ
|N |
]
. (31)
Therefore, we conclude the following.
sc(f(x),x)
sc(Opt,x)
≤
sc(f(x′),x′) + |M |
[
δ2 + 43δ −
2|M |δ
|N |
]
sc(Opt′,x′) + ∆Opt
. (32)
We next distinguish between two cases: one where Opt is on path(y1, yn), and the second in which it is
not. We start with the former case. In this case, it is easy to verify that ∆Opt ≥ |M |δ2. In addition, due to
Equation (27), it holds that sc(f(x
′),x′)+1 1
2
|M |δ2
sc(Opt′,x′)+|M |δ2
≤ 112 . Together with (32), it follows that
sc(f(x),x)
sc(Opt,x)
≤ 1
1
2
+
|M |
[
− δ
2
2 +
4
3δ −
2|M |δ
|N |
]
sc(Opt′,x′) + |M |δ2
. (33)
Next, we point out that sc(Opt′,x′) ≥ |N |6 . This is due to the fact that each of Q and P must contain at
least |N |/3 agents each, and thus even if all the remaining agents would be located on Opt′, and P and Q
would be located as close to Opt as possible, the cost could not be lower than |N |6 . Therefore, we conclude
that
sc(f(x),x)
sc(Opt,x)
≤ 1
1
2
+
|M |
[
− δ
2
2 +
4
3δ −
2|M |δ
|N |
]
|N |
6 + |M |δ
2
. (34)
A numeric analysis would find that the maximal value obtained for the right-hand side of (34) is 1.82085 . . .
(obtained by fixing δ = 0.54144 . . . and |M | = 29 |N |).
It is left to analyze the latter case, namely the case in which Opt is not on path(y1, yn). Due to Corollary 7,
when moving the facility location from O¯pt to Opt, its induced cost is reduced by |N |d(O¯pt,Opt)2. Let
T1, T2 ∈ T (G,Opt), such that the agents fromM are in T1. Due to Lemma 3, it holds that
∑
xi∈T1
d(xi, Opt) =∑
xi∈T2
d(xi, Opt). By substituting the left-hand side and the right-hand side, we get
|M |(δ − d(O¯pt,Opt)) = (1− |M |)d(O¯pt,Opt) +
∑
xi∈T2
d(xi, O¯pt). (35)
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Since
∑
xi∈T2
d(xi, O¯pt) ≥
|N |
3 , and by rearranging we get that
|M |
|N |
δ −
1
3
≥ d(O¯pt,Opt). (36)
Now we can bound ∆Opt as follows.
∆Opt = [sc(O¯pt,x)− sc(Opt
′,x′)]− [sc(O¯pt,x)− sc(Opt,x)]
≥ [sc(O¯pt,x)− sc(O¯pt,x′)]− [sc(O¯pt,x)− sc(Opt,x)] ≥ |M |δ2 − |N |
(
|M |
|N |
δ −
1
3
)2
.
Following the steps of the former case, it follows that
sc(f(x),x)
sc(Opt,x)
≤ 1
1
2
+
|M |
[
− δ
2
2 +
4
3δ −
2|M |δ
|N |
]
+ 32 |N |
(
|M |
|N | δ −
1
3
)2
|N |
6 + |M |δ
2 − |N |
(
|M |
|N | δ −
1
3
)2 . (37)
A numeric analysis would find that the maximal value obtained for the right-hand side of (37) is 1.611 . . .
(obtained by fixing δ = 1.0446 . . . and |M | = 0.32|N |). The assertion of the lemma follows. 
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